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n 2006, Sally Satel, a lecturer at the Yale University
School of Medicine and a resident scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute, a Washington, D.C.-
based think tank, received a kidney donation. She was one
of the lucky ones. “In the fall of 2008 in the United States,”
she reports, “over 100,000 Americans were candidates for
transplantable kidneys, livers, hearts, and lungs.”
The vast majority of transplant candidates — about 75
percent — need kidneys. But they face a mounting challenge.
“Twenty-five years ago, the average wait for a deceased-donor
kidney in the United States was about one year; currently, 
the average wait is approaching five years, and, in many parts
of the country, it is nearing ten,” she writes. “Last year, over
four thousand wait-listed individuals died.”
Considering the huge human cost of the failure to meet
this demand, Satel and Richard Epstein, a law professor at
the University of Chicago, organized a conference in July
2007 to discuss alternatives to the current U.S. transplant
system. The event consisted of presentations by economists,
philosophers, physicians, and others interested in exploring
the possibility of a more efficient and humane way of 
allocating kidney transplants. The papers presented at that
conference are collected in this volume.
To most economists, the idea of creating a “market” for
organs is neither new nor inherently objectionable. But 
to many others, the idea seems ghastly, something out 
of a dystopian science fiction novel. In this volume, the 
economic arguments for compensating kidney donors are
addressed — as well as the ethical concerns that may, in 
the end, prove to be the biggest obstacle to adopting such a
system.
In 1984, the National Organ Transplant Act was passed.
The Act banned offering “valuable consideration” to people
in exchange for donating organs. In short, donors could not
be compensated. This, according to David C. Cronin II,
director of liver transplantation at the Medical College of
Wisconsin, and Julio J. Elías, an economist at the State
University of New York at Buffalo, “has failed to procure the
requisite numbers of kidneys for transplant.” They outline
two alternative approaches, one that they call the “free 
market system” and one they dub the “centralized system.”
Under the free market system, those in need of organs
could potentially make private arrangements with donors,
determining a price for the donation, making provisions for
post-operative medical care, and handling other details that
would be made contractually explicit. In a separate paper,
Elías and economist Gary Becker of the University of
Chicago have estimated that the compensation required to
eliminate the shortage of organs would be roughly $15,000.
Such a system “would encourage some patients to secure
transplant organs legally rather than turning to the black
market, particularly since the wait in the legitimate system
would be sharply reduced,” write Cronin and Elías. But they
argue that such a system is too controversial and “will garner
virtually no political support.” 
The centralized system, on the other hand, would 
be more likely to gain such support. Under that system, 
donor compensation “would be fixed in advance by the 
government (federal or state), which would serve as the 
single payer and prospectively determine the type 
and duration of payments,” Cronin and  Elías write. “The 
compensation could take any number of forms, including
fixed payment or in-kind rewards, such as long-term health
insurance, college tuition, or tax deductions, or a package
that included some combination of these or other, equally
valuable, alternatives.”
An obvious question raised by the centralized system
proposal is: Wouldn’t such government compensation to
donors increase the cost to the public? Possibly, but as
explored elsewhere in the book, current government provi-
sion of dialysis treatment and other care needed by patients
with severe kidney problems, through Medicare and
Medicaid, is expensive too. On balance, then, a system that
would use public funding to compensate people who other-
wise might not donate organs likely would be less costly than
the present system. And it would almost surely reduce the
shortage of available organs, giving life to people who might
die waiting for  purely benevolent donors. 
The economic and ethical arguments for adopting 
a more incentive-based system of organ transplantation —
one that does not rely solely on the altruism of donors, 
as important and noble as these selfless acts certainly are —
will seem strong, indeed compelling, to many readers. But
they probably will not convince those people who open this
book instinctively believing that paying people for organs is
simply wrong. Ultimately, this debate involves more than
simple cost-benefit analyses. It requires serious thought
about difficult normative issues. But one has to wonder: Is it
really desirable to cling to a system that fails to save the lives
of thousands of people each year when an alternative
approach is within our reach? RF
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